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Executive Summary 
 
Building energy data disclosure is becoming seen as an increasingly viable option for 
cities looking to benchmark their energy use. However, disclosure policies are frequently limited 
to large commercial buildings; in contrast, conversations around residential buildings are usually 
framed through a privacy lens, with an emphasis placed on restricting energy data access, rather 
than facilitating it. Yet information disclosure in the residential sector has a strong precedent in 
the housing market, as policies such as Seller’s Disclosure Laws reduce information asymmetry 
by informing prospective homebuyers and renters about potential deficiencies of properties. A 
case study of Saint Paul, Minnesota demonstrates how existing disclosure options for prospective 
homebuyers and renters can be broken down into four categories: data, rating, structure, and 
combination disclosure. Of the currently existing disclosure options, however, no policy 
adequately informs prospective buyers and renters as to their energy costs. To rectify this market 
failure, this paper recommends that the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission issue a rule 
requiring utilities to make annual energy use data of residential buildings available to the public.  
 
Introduction 
 
        In an age when public data can be compiled to create information profiles on individual 
consumers, residential energy consumption data practices have become a major concern for 
customers of gas and electric public utilities. This concern has only increased with the more 
widespread adoption of Advanced Metering Infrastructure (“AMI”), which can record energy use 
data down to one-minute intervals, allowing for a precise, thorough understanding of residential 
energy use patterns. Some residential customers, understandably, do not want this type of “real-
time” data available to the public, as it could enable an advanced understanding about a 
customer’s household activities. As a response to these concerns, many utilities and their 
regulatory bodies have enacted consumer data privacy policies to prevent against the disclosure of 
data that may exacerbate privacy concerns. 
Such policies frequently address the release of energy consumption data to third parties; 
that is, a person or an organization that is neither the consumer nor the utility. Third parties are 
interested in obtaining data for a variety of reasons, and so the possibilities of “use cases” for 
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energy data are diverse. Examples of third parties can include cities interested in reducing carbon 
emissions, contractors looking to target high-energy homes for future business, law enforcement 
officials looking to demonstrate drug activity, and burglars looking to assess home occupancy 
patterns. Clearly, while some parties might be justified in looking to obtain energy data, others 
may have less benign intentions. When examining consumption data policies, it is critical to 
understand the range of third-party use cases. 
This paper addresses a third-party data privacy practice that may have gone too far in its 
attempt to protect consumer privacy: some energy utilities have begun refusing to disclose 
residential energy use information to prospective homebuyers and renters. This practice creates 
information asymmetry in the housing and rental markets, which has the potential to interfere 
with both consumer protection practices and energy conservation goals. To the first point, when 
consumers do not know the cost of energy in advance, they are not only unable to plan for 
monthly operating expenses, but also are unable to plan for the costs of needed energy efficiency 
improvements. Unsurprisingly, low-income consumers face much greater financial risks by not 
being able to plan for the costs of energy in advance of purchasing or renting. To the second 
point, when energy information is not disclosed in the rental and housing markets, there is no 
market value ascribed to low energy costs, and by extension, to building efficiency. This means 
that sellers and landlords do not see a market return on investing in efficiency measures, which 
creates a disincentive to making these investments in the first place. By the same token, it means 
there is no market penalty for having higher energy bills, and so prospective buyers and tenants 
cannot exercise market pressure upon sellers and landlords to invest in efficiency measures.  
While consumer protection and building efficiency are two distinct societal goals, they are 
both implicated by energy information asymmetry in the housing and rental markets. This is 
especially important for state governments and regulatory bodies who have an interest in 
promoting both affordable energy for consumers while simultaneously reducing fossil fuel use 
and greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. 
To provide context for the issue of consumption data practices, this paper will first provide 
background on how consumption data privacy became a topic of discussion on a national scale. 
Then, I will look specifically at Minnesota, and at how these more restrictive data practices came 
into being. This paper will then discuss why privacy concerns relating to AMI are different from 
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the privacy concerns relating to monthly billing disclosure or average annual disclosure, and 
examine some existing energy disclosure ordinances and policies on the national scene. 
To better understand the different types of disclosure in the housing and rental markets, 
this paper uses Saint Paul, Minnesota as a case study to review existing disclosure policies. 
Existing disclosure policies can be broadly broken down into four categories: data, rating, and 
structure disclosure policies, with the fourth category being a combination of data, rating, and/or 
structure disclosure. In this case study, I have considered options available to both prospective 
homebuyers and renters because rental housing comprises nearly half of the entire Saint Paul 
housing landscape.1 In reviewing existing options of disclosure in Saint Paul, it is clear that 
existing policies provide insufficient options for prospective buyers and renters interested in 
assessing energy costs. 
To address this market deficiency, this paper proposes and evaluates the following policy 
alternatives: 
 
1. The City of Saint Paul should adopt an Audit Disclosure Ordinance 
2. The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission should make a rule on Docket 12-1344, or 
a separate docket if needed, that directs regulated utilities to make average annual 
energy use and cost information available to the public 
3. The Minnesota Legislature should amend the Seller’s Disclosure statute to specify that 
energy use and cost information is required at point of sale 
 
To evaluate these proposed alternatives, this paper will examine each of these alternatives based 
on the following criteria: cost effectiveness, potential impact, political feasibility, and 
administrative feasibility. Given these criteria, I recommend that the Minnesota Public Utilities 
Commission make a rule requiring utility disclosure of average annual energy use and cost 
information. 
 Through this discussion, I endeavor to demonstrate that there is value to both consumers 
and society in requiring energy disclosure in the rental and residential real estate markets, and to 
demonstrate the importance of tailoring data privacy practices to different use cases. 
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Problem Definition 
 
Information Asymmetry in the Rental and Housing Markets 
The problem with preventing prospective homebuyers and renters from accessing utility 
data is that it leads to information asymmetry in the housing and rental markets. Information 
asymmetry arises when two parties do not have the same amount of information about a particular 
issue;2 in the case of energy data disclosure, this means that the seller knows the billing history of 
the property, while the buyer does not. In a market where energy disclosure is not a common 
practice, an account holder who is selling their house only has an incentive to release the data if 
the house uses energy efficiently; a seller with an inefficient property is actively dis-incentivized 
from disclosing this data since it may dissuade buyers or drive down the price. 
While landlords renting out their property experience the same disincentive for releasing 
data, they may face an additional barrier under restrictive privacy policies: if the property’s 
energy bills are in a previous tenant’s name, the landlord will not be able to access the data, even 
if they wanted to provide it to a prospective tenant. 
Historically, information asymmetry in the housing market has been mitigated through 
mechanisms such as Seller’s Disclosure Laws, which seek to enable informed consumer decision-
making at the time of buying a property. Disclosure laws place the onus on the seller to be up-
front in disclosing hidden costs associated with a property, rather than on the buyer to flush out 
hidden costs. These laws, which were adopted by a majority of states in the 1960s, replaced the 
previous doctrine of caveat emptor, or “buyer beware.”3  
 
Implications for Household Energy Affordability 
While consumers at all income levels are affected by market information asymmetry, low-
income consumers will suffer a proportionally greater consequence from having higher-than-
expected energy costs as a result of uninformed decision-making. If they do not know home 
operating costs upfront, they shoulder a greater risk when purchasing or renting. This has larger 
societal equity implications, particularly in a post-mortgage-crisis environment. 
When energy costs are a smaller part of home operating costs, the cost of owning a home 
becomes much more affordable. A 2009 study of 229 homes across five subdivisions in 
Gainesville, Florida, found that the average ENERGY STAR home saved $180.00 per year in 
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energy costs, which was capitalized to a home value increase of $4,500.00, and the ability to 
afford a mortgage $2,255.00 greater.4 More recently, a study by the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill and the Institute for Market Transformation (“IMT”) found that in a sample of 
71,000 ENERGY STAR and non-ENERGY STAR single-family homes, risks of mortgage 
default are 32% lower in efficient homes.5 The authors of both of these studies point to the 
importance of energy operating costs as a component of housing affordability. 
Yet housing occupied by low-income families is more likely to be inefficient, and so more 
likely to result in higher bills for occupants. A 2009 study by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
(“ORNL”) found that while the average energy consumption per square foot for low-income 
households was 31 MBtus, this number was 24 MBtus for non low-income households. ORNL 
additionally found that while 28% of low-income households reported inadequate insulation, only 
17% of non low-income households reported inadequate insulation.6  
Yet even if building efficiency were comparable across income demographics, low-
income households will still experience a higher “energy burden” (or “bill-to-income ratio”) than 
the household with an average income and comparable bills. In other words, the lower a 
household’s income, the greater the relative cost of energy.  
  It can be useful to use rough energy costs and income estimates to understand how renters 
and homeowners across different income groups experience the cost of energy. Assuming an 
average annual per-household energy cost of $1,947.00,7 which was taken from the Energy 
Information Administration’s (“EIA’s”) Residential Energy Consumption Survey (“RECS”), we 
can compare income data for 2,107,232 occupied housing units in Minnesota surveyed in the 
2009-13 American Community Survey (“ACS”). Table 1 shows how much households living at 
different income levels are impacted by the same energy cost. 
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 Minnesota Percentage of 
occupied 
housing units 
(2,107,232 
total) 
Percentage of 
owner-occupied 
housing units 
(1,528,272 total) 
Percentage of 
renter-
occupied 
housing units 
(578,960 total) 
Energy burden based on 
2009 average regional 
consumption data 
($1947/year) 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN 
THE PAST 12 MONTHS (IN 
2013 INFLATION-
ADJUSTED DOLLARS) 
      
  
  Less than $5,000 2.4% 1.2% 5.70% Greater than 38.94% 
  $5,000 to $9,999 3.2% 1.3% 8.2% 19.47% to 38.94% 
  $10,000 to $14,999 4.5% 2.4% 10.1% 12.98% to 19.47% 
  $15,000 to $19,999 4.7% 3.0% 9.3% 9.74% to 12.98% 
  $20,000 to $24,999 4.6% 3.4% 8.0% 7.78% to 9.74% 
  $25,000 to $34,999 9.3% 7.4% 14.2% 5.56% to 7.78% 
  $35,000 to $49,999 13.2% 12.3% 15.8% 3.89% to 5.56% 
  $50,000 to $74,999 19.1% 20.5% 15.5% 2.30% to 3.89% 
  $75,000 to $99,999 14.3% 17.0% 7.0% 1.95% to 2.30% 
  $100,000 to $149,999 14.9% 18.8% 4.5% 1.30% to 1.95% 
  $150,000 or more 9.8% 12.9% 1.7% Less than 1.30% 
            
  Median household income 
(dollars) 
59,836 73,314 30,934 
  
Energy burden of median 
household incomes based on 
2009 average regional 
consumption data 
($1947/year) 
3.25% 2.66% 6.29% 
  
Table 1. Energy burden by household income and housing type in Minnesota 2013, using a set cost of 
energy. 
Sources: US Census Bureau, 2009-2013 5-Year American Community Survey; US Energy Information 
Administration, 2009 Residential Energy Consumption Survey Data, Totals and Intensities8 
 
There are two core points to be taken from this table. The first is that the same energy bill 
impacts renters and owners in Minnesota differently. While a household earning the median 
income for owner-occupied homes may only experience a household energy burden of 2.66% at 
the average RECS energy level, a household earning the median income for renter-occupied 
homes will experience a household energy burden of 6.29%. This discrepancy indicates that even 
when the energy cost is the same, rental populations will experience a higher energy burden than 
home-owning populations. 
The second important point is that the energy burden figures by median area income tell a 
very different story from energy burdens calculated by income ranges. Looking at the energy 
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burden by income ranges, it is apparent that, when using the average annual RECS usage data, an 
estimated 15% of Minnesota households would spend more than 10% of their income on energy 
bills. This figure drops to 8% for owner-occupants, but jumps up to 33% for renter-occupied 
housing. For rental populations, a full 14% would pay more than 20% of their income towards 
their utility bills. 
The point of this demonstration is to show how the same exact utility bill will impact 
different income and housing demographics differently; it is not intended to calculate actual 
energy burdens across the state in Minnesota. However, we can see that if two households, one 
low-income and one non-low-income, are considering buying or renting the same property, the 
low-income household is taking a larger financial risk by not knowing the full costs of operating 
up front. Information asymmetry about energy costs puts a greater risk burden on low-income 
households. 
 
Implications for the Value of Building Energy Efficiency 
Information asymmetry resulting from more restrictive data policies also has implications 
for household energy conservation, specifically with regard to building efficiency.  
Building efficiency is frequently seen as an important component of energy conservation. 
The EIA estimates that in 2014, residential and commercial buildings consumed 41% of total 
energy consumed in the United States, or about 40 quadrillion Btus.9 Of this, about 10 quadrillion 
Btus came from the estimated 113.6 million housing units in the residential sector, costing 
residences an estimated $230 billion dollars per year.10 The Department of Energy’s (“DOE’s”) 
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (“EERE”) estimates that of the $2,000.00 the 
average American spends on energy per year, between $200.00 and $400.00, or 10-20% is likely 
wasted as a result of building inefficiencies.11 If these household savings can be scaled nationally, 
then U.S. homeowners have the potential to collectively save between $230 and $460 million per 
year through efficiency measures. 
While building efficiency is frequently identified as a means to achieving energy savings, 
it has historically been difficult to assign market value to building efficiency. Yet a growing body 
of work shows that if efficiency measures are properly valued in the market, this has the potential 
to incentivize buyers and landlords to invest in energy efficient retrofits.12  
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However, reducing information asymmetry is not just about creating monetary value for 
the property; it’s also about de-valuing inefficient properties. For example, if tenants see that a 
properties has higher-than-average bills, they may not be as likely to rent at the property, which in 
turn puts market pressure on the landlord to make their property more appealing by investing in 
energy efficiency. This is particularly important, since landlords are dis-incentivized from 
investing in efficiency when they aren’t the ones paying the energy bills, a problem known as the 
“split-incentive barrier.”13 Preventing prospective tenants’ access to reliable and current data 
further exacerbates the landlord tenant split incentive barrier because it takes away the one point 
of leverage tenants, collectively, have: exerting market pressure on a prospective landlord to 
invest in efficiency measures. 
In order for disclosure policies to be effective in creating market value around building 
efficiency, the data must be collected and disseminated in such a way that is useful for end-
users.14 However, what is considered “useful” depends on who you ask. For example, IMT points 
out that while appraisers find billing history to be a sufficient valuation tool, energy specialists 
prefer building simulation methods that provide a building rating.15  
There are good reasons for the divergence. It is critical to note is that energy data is not 
necessarily indicative of building efficiency; behavior plays a large role in actual energy use. 
Even if a prospective homebuyer or renter can see billing information prior to purchase or signing 
a lease, the existing account holder’s energy use might not be a fair representation of the next 
account holder’s energy use.16 On the other hand, there are also reasons why billing disclosure 
may be preferable to rating disclosure in some circumstances. First, rating disclosure does not 
provide direct information about residential operating costs. Second, without data, rating 
disclosure can only provide modeled assumptions of potential energy savings and carbon 
emissions reductions, rather than actual performance figures. While ratings and data disclosure 
are both important tools for properly valuing efficiency in the market, this paper focuses primarily 
on the latter.  
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Background: Energy Consumption Data 
 
Energy consumption data or customer energy usage data (“CEUD”)17 has become a topic 
of heated debate due in part to the deployment of AMI, which involves the use of “smart meter” 
technology.18 AMI is frequently cited as having the potential to revolutionize the electricity grid, 
producing benefits for both households and utilities through allowing two-way communication 
between consumers and the grid. 
 
 
Figure 1. Analogue meter and smart meter. 
Sources: Images retrieved online from Pacific Gas and Electric and Citizens Utility Board. 
 
 
Enabling the AMI revolution is the ability to record highly granular data. Rather than 
recording data on a monthly basis, as Traditional and Automated Meters do,19 smart meters can 
record data in hour-based or even minute-based increments. The greater degree of precision smart 
meters provide has engendered much more concern about privacy because studies have shown 
that data recorded at the minute-interval can be used to infer specific household activities. 
In 2002, Wood and Newborough published Dynamic energy-consumption indicators for 
domestic appliances: environment, behavior, and design.20 Their study, which sought to 
demonstrate how individual consumers might interact with their own smart-meter-generated 
energy data, included the following graph, which shows household energy use on a per-minute 
increment scale: 
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 Figure 2. Wood and Newborough’s electricity demand profile graph, based one 1-min time base. 
Source: Wood and Newborough, “Dynamic Energy-Consumption Indicators for Domestic Appliances.” 
 
 
Since it was first published, several high-profile reports have used the graphic to 
demonstrate the level of household detail that can be obtained from smart meters. Among such 
reports were the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (“NIST’s”) 2010 Guidelines 
for Smart Grid Cyber Security,21 the Congressional Research Service’s 2012 Smart Meter Data: 
Privacy and Cyber Security,22 and a 2009 report presented to the Colorado Public Utilities 
Commission.23 Interestingly, in a Google Image search of “smart meter data,” it comprised two of 
the first five images yielded.24 The image, in short, has contributed meaningfully to the 
conversation of privacy concerns surrounding AMI. 
While Wood and Newborough’s graph has not been the only image cited in energy data 
discussions, privacy advocates frequently base their concerns around this level of data granularity. 
After the NIST 2010 report, anti-smart meter advocates created the following list of “Potential 
Privacy Impacts” based on information from the report:25 
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Privacy Concern Discussion 
1. Identity Theft Specific combinations of Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”) may be used to 
impersonate a utility consumer, resulting in potentially severe impacts, such as 
negative credit reports, fraudulent utility use, and other damaging consumer actions. 
2. Determine Personal 
Behavior Patterns 
 
Access to data use profiles that can reveal specific times 
and locations of electricity usage in specific areas of the home can also indicate the 
types of activities and/or appliances used. This data analysis process is a form of 
surveillance. The data could be (mis)used by: (1) organizations to perform “target” 
marketing; (2) governments to tax specific activities and uses; and (3) persons to 
conduct activities with malicious intent. 
3. Determine Specific 
Appliances Used 
Smart meters will provide capability to track appliance usage either through remote 
location software algorithms or meters that are specifically programmed to 
communicate with the smart appliances. Appliance manufacturers may want to 
acquire this information to know who, how, and why individuals used their products 
in certain ways. Such information could impact appliance warranties. Insurance 
companies may want to use this information to approve or decline claims. There is an 
unlimited number of other possible uses for the data as yet not imagined. 
 
4. Perform Real-Time 
Surveillance 
Access to near real-time energy usage data can reveal if people are in the residence, 
what they are doing, where they are in the residence, and so on. This not only 
presents a safety risk, with burglars and vandals using it to their destruction, but it 
could also be used to do target marketing based upon home energy use behaviors. 
5. Reveal Activities 
Through Residual Data 
Several articles have been published warning that if the data on the metering devices 
is not effectively or completely removed, the residual data can reveal former 
customer activities to the new meter user or entity. If true, not only does this present 
similar concerns to those listed above (in other privacy concern areas), it could also 
be used by activists or others who have agendas to reveal what they view as a lack of 
social responsibility. 
6. Targeted Home 
Invasions (latch key 
children, elderly, etc.) 
Malicious use of meter data for specific consumers could lead to a wide number of 
problems, such as physical invasions to the home because crooks could tell when 
certain residents were away, or whether a home is totally unoccupied or vacant. 
7. Provide Accidental 
Invasions 
 
Meter data could be systematically analyzed in a way to reveal unusual or unexpected 
appliance usage or behavior patterns later used to the detriment of residents. 
8. Activity Censorship 
 
The meter data could reveal resident activities or appliance usage that utility 
companies may then subsequently decide are inappropriate or should not be allowed. 
Without restrictions, if this information could then shared with local government, law 
enforcement, or public media outlets, the residents could suffer embarrassment, 
harassment, loss of vital appliances, or any number of other damaging actions. 
9. Decisions and Actions 
Based Upon Inaccurate 
Data 
 
With meter data being stored in potentially many locations, accessed by so many 
different individuals and entities, and used for a very wide variety of purposes, it is a 
significant risk that the PII data will become inappropriately modified. Automated 
Smart Grid decisions made for home energy usage could not only be detrimental for 
residents (e.g., restricted power, thermostats turned to dangerous levels, and so on) 
but decisions about Smart Grid power use and activities could be based upon 
inaccurate information. 
10. Profiling Profiling may occur in ways that were previously not possible, or not as easily 
possible. What can you tell about someone by analyzing energy consumption? For 
example, is the consumer having an affair? Terrorist profiles? Illegal activities, e.g., 
marijuana growing? Will access to do data mining for investigations put people on 
terrorist watch lists, etc.? Will politicians want to use data for potential activity 
taxation? 
 
11. Unwanted Publicity There could be embarrassment and other negative impacts resulting from 
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and Embarrassment 
 
unauthorized disclosure and/or publication of household appliance usage, behavior 
patterns, or electric vehicle use. 
12. Tracking Behavior Of 
Renters/Leasers 
 
When an individual other than the resident owns and pays the utilities, such as in the 
case of a rental unit, apartment subletting, leasing, and so on, the landlord or property 
owner will likely have “authorized” and easy access to the smart meter data through a 
utility online portal website. The renter’s electricity, gas, and possibly water usage 
patterns and behavior could be monitored in near real-time. Hypothetically, a landlord 
could use information obtained from smart meter data to determine whether the 
tenant has broken a lease provision or for other more malicious purposes. Rent 
decisions could be made based on past power usage history. Power usage profiling 
records could follow individuals to future residences and impact a wide range of 
decisions. 
13. Behavior Tracking 
(possible combination with 
Personal Behavior 
Patterns) 
Will there be any items within the smart meters that could act in ways similar to 
browser/document cookies or web bugs? If so, these items could be (mis)used in 
ways similar to how cookies and web bugs are currently (mis)used. Is there any 
possible technological connection for power usage records in the smart meter to the 
Internet, cell phone carriers, appliance companies, etc.? 
14. Public Aggregated 
Searches Revealing 
Individual Behavior 
 
What kind of smart grid search engines will there be? What discussions or plans have 
occurred around this possibility? What information would be involved? What control 
would consumers have to prevent their data from being included in such searches? 
The privacy issues would be similar to the privacy concerns that currently exist with 
Internet search engines, but the implications could be more wide reaching because the 
data would be based upon individuals' actual daily living activities, and not upon 
what they consciously chose to put onto the Internet. 
Table 2. Potential Privacy Impacts with Discussion, as cited by Anti-Smart Meter Advocates. 
Sources: Herold, “Potential Privacy Impacts for Smart Grid Information Disclosure and Misuse.” Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, “The Smart Grid and Privacy.” 
 
These fourteen bullet points, which appear to have been initially published on the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center’s (“EPIC’s”) website, then annotated by Rebecca Herold 
and Associates, have been redistributed among anti-smart meter advocates, and even appear in a 
complaint form issued to the Maine Public Utilities Commission.26 This paper does not seek to 
address the legitimacy of any of these claims in regards to AMI; rather, this table is intended to 
demonstrate how customer-generated concerns about AMI have focused on one-minute time 
interval level of data granularity. 
To address these types of privacy concerns, some state Public Utilities Commissions 
(“PUC’s”) have opened and ruled upon so-called “Privacy Dockets” to standardize practices. 
Early on, in a 1997 decision, the California PUC decided to use account aggregation as a way to 
render usage data anonymous in a specific Direct Access case.27 The aggregation standard they 
set, frequently called the “15/15” standard, stated that aggregated data must contain at least 15 
accounts, with no one account comprising more than 15% of the total aggregate energy usage. 
California’s ruling was very narrow in scope, and the CPUC has since clarified that the 15/15 standard was 
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not intended as a standard for aggregated generic data access.28 However, in 2012, the Colorado PUC 
implemented 15/15 standard on a statewide level, ruling that no utility should disclose individual 
CEUD to a third party absent the consent of the account holder.29 Since California’s early 
decision and Colorado’s more expansive decision, many other state PUCs have begun to examine 
their own consumption data privacy practices. 
In their recent paper “Energy Consumption Data: The Key to Improved Energy 
Efficiency,” Klass and Wilson document how these types of PUC rulings have begun to conflict 
with an increased interest in local and state laws that seek to improve building energy efficiency 
through data transparency laws.30 The question is one of jurisdiction: who has authority to decide 
data access policies, a local government or a Public Utilities Commission? 
This question is important because many local transparency laws require state and local 
officials to obtain CEUD in order to benchmark energy use; but data acquisition has sometimes 
been at odds with aggregation levels such as the 15/15 standard. On one hand, aggregation levels 
do not necessarily line up with existing building stock; a city official who wants to benchmark a 
building with four meters will not be able to understand the building’s energy use if the minimum 
aggregation level is set at fifteen accounts. Conversely, a city official who wants to benchmark a 
building with fourteen meters will need to obtain written consent of energy disclosure from each 
and every account holder.31 
Klass and Wilson’s jurisdiction question will only become more pressing as an increasing 
number of state and local bodies have enacted building benchmarking and transparency policies. 
In the last month alone both Atlanta and Portland, OR have enacted transparency policies. IMT 
and partner organization Building Rating have recently published the most current map of 
disclosure policies across the country: 
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Figure 3. U.S. Building Benchmarking and Transparency Policies, Institute for Market Transformation and 
Building Rating. 
Source: Keicher, “Map: U.S. Building Benchmarking and Transparency Policies.” 
 
 
IMT and Building Rating identify four types of disclosure policies around the country: 
Commercial, Commercial and Multifamily, Public Buildings, and Single-Family. Contrast to this, the 
American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (“ACEEE”) identifies four types of transparency 
laws: Asset Ratings, Utility Bills, Energy Efficiency Features, and Benchmarking.xxxii 
Notably, while many policies address commercial, multi-family, and public buildings, 
fewer deal with the disclosure of single-family transparency policies. However, single-family 
transparency policies, along with single-meter transparency policies, are the most applicable when 
talking about disclosure in the housing and rental markets. To complicate matters even further, 
single-family disclosure policies range in the scope of implementation. ACEEE provides the 
following examples of types of ordinances: 
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Table 3: ACEEE’s Examples of Exiting Disclosure Policy Goals and Requirements. 
Source: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, “Residential Energy Use Disclosure: A 
Guide for PolicyMakers.” 
 
Simply, even those these policies all deal with disclosure in the housing and rental 
markets, they disclose different types of information. While Austin’s policy releases building 
energy audit information, Santa Fe’s releases building rating, and Chicago’s releases building 
data.  
In order to enact these types of policies, a critical question has been the jurisdictional 
relationship of the utility, local government, and governing PUC. The question of conflicting 
jurisdictions came to a head in Minnesota when, in February of 2013, the City of Minneapolis 
adopted a benchmarking ordinance requiring commercial buildings over 50,000 square feet and 
city-owned buildings over 25,000 square feet to annually benchmark and report to the City their 
energy usage.32 By this time, Xcel Energy, already having implemented 15/15 in Colorado, was 
interested in implementing the same standard in Minnesota. 
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The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission 
In March of 2012, Xcel Energy (“Xcel”) filed a Customer Data Privacy Tariff with the 
MPUC in Docket 12-188, which would allow Xcel to adopt the “15/15” rule in Minnesota.33 
Many groups, including the City of Minneapolis, commented on the filing, stating that the 15/15 
rule was unusable for the purposes of benchmarking. The filing and subsequent comments 
resulted in questions from the MPUC regarding wider utility data privacy questions: What were 
the common practices amongst utilities? What is an adequate level of aggregation for protecting 
customer privacy while still ensuring that benchmarking groups can effectively meet their state-
mandated goals? 
     To analyze these questions, MPUC opened a new docket, 12-1344, and established a 
CEUD Work Group in June of 2013.34 Facilitated by a judge from the Office of Administrative 
Hearings, the CEUD Work Group was made up of participants and observers representing 
utilities, cities, state agencies, nonprofits, and trade groups. Of the participating utilities (Xcel, 
CenterPoint, Dakota Electric Association, and Minnesota Power), none reported currently using 
AMI.35 The Work Group met over the course of nine months to discuss the tradeoffs between data 
access and privacy, and in the end produced a report detailing recommendations for the MPUC.  
Much of the Work Group’s report dealt with the question of jurisdiction: does the MPUC 
have the authority to regulate consumption data practices? In the end, the Work Group decided 
that the MPUC does have the authority because, as Xcel put it “If we charge, it’s a rate. If we 
provide data without charge, it’s a service. Both rates and services are covered by the PUC’s 
broad authority.”36 
Much of the Work Group’s report described various use cases of how data might be 
sought and used by third parties. Almost unanimously,37 the Work Group decided that any use 
cases involving individual account-level data should not be considered eligible for release to third 
parties absent consent. This included two use cases that involved the release of individual CEUD 
in the housing market. 
Early on during the meetings of the Work Group, all participating utilities reported that, 
upon request, they will give out average annual usage data, along with high month/low month 
figures to prospective homebuyers, renters, and affiliated real estate agents. However, this 
changed during the course of the Work Group’s meetings. The final report states: 
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The only reported caveat to this general practice [of not disclosing 
individual account-level data] relates to utilities' historic practices involving 
realtors. For decades, some utilities have provided information about a 
specific property's average annual utility usage and costs to realtors upon 
request, without proof of consent from a current or former owner or building 
occupant. Participants explained that this practice grew out of the 
recognition that this information is useful to facilitate sales and lease 
transactions. Given the level of current public interest in privacy issues, 
Xcel Energy recently changed its practice and now requires requesting 
realtors to obtain specific consent from utility customers, thus handling 
these requests in the same manner as those from all other non-customer-of-
record requestors. Both CenterPoint Energy and Dakota Electric Association 
reported that they continue to provide realtors, upon request, with a 
property's average energy usage over the past 12-month period without 
seeking or obtaining customer consent.38 
  
Xcel has since confirmed that it continues to require customer consent in order to disclose 
any CEUD, including instances involving prospective buyers and renters.39 Additionally, since 
the time of the CEUD Work Group Report, CenterPoint has also changed its policy to limit 
disclosure only to cases where consent is given.40  
A critical thing to note, however, is that these utility policy changes have not been enacted 
to intentionally harm customers; to the contrary, Xcel Energy has expressed interest in providing 
the best customer service possible in this regard, with an appropriate balance between data access 
and data privacy.41 However, without direction from the MPUC, the utilities are putting 
themselves at risk by providing any data, even average annual data, to requestors. In order to 
eliminate this liability, utilities must have explicit direction from the MPUC.  
Since the MN dockets were first opened, a few new changes have occurred on the national 
scene. In 2014, California made an official statewide ruling to include different types of data 
disclosure standards for different customer classes and use cases.42 More recently, Colorado has 
enacted a rule that would allow an aggregation standard of 4/50, for whole buildings only.43 In 
January, the US DOE released a Voluntary Code of Conduct (“VCC”), meant to serve as a guide 
for state regulators deciding upon energy data privacy rules.44 Last month, the American 
Statistical Association’s (“ASA”) Privacy and Confidentiality Committee and Energy 
Subcommittee released “Recommendations for State Public Utility Commissions to Assess the 
Sensitivity of Tabular Data Revealing Identifiable Energy Consumption Information.” As part of 
their recommendations, they state that the “15/15” rule is too restrictive and recommends that 
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“sensitivity rules” should vary depending on the customer class, the utility’s distribution and 
population counts throughout their entire service territory for that class, and the specific needs of 
the local government requesting the information.45 Given these decisions and releases, there 
appears to be a trend toward tailoring different data access policies to different use cases.  
As of yet, the MPUC has not made a rule about either docket 12-188, or docket 12-1344. 
The Executive Secretary of the MPUC recently decided to reconvene the Work Group for an 
additional two meetings, dates to be determined, to gather input on the DOE’s VCC.46  
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Data Use Case: Housing and Rental Market Disclosure 
 
As illustrated by the recent precedents in California, Colorado, and by the DOE and ASA, 
it important to establish different types of privacy policies for different use cases when looking at 
Minnesota. It is therefore also important to fully specify the type of data, how it might be 
inappropriately used, and whether cited privacy concerns are warranted. Through this discussion, 
it becomes clear that existing efforts to define this type of use case have fallen short. 
The CEUD Work Group identifies three different use cases that specifically relate to the 
housing and rental markets.47 The table below describes some of the characteristics identified 
about each: 
 
 Use Case #1 Use Case #2 Use Case #3 
Use Case Type/Category Individual CEUD Individual CEUD Energy Benchmarking Multi-
tenant/Multi-
family/Commercial Building 
with Separate Tenant Meters 
Requestor (who wants the 
data) 
Real Estate Agents Homeowner or 
potential homeowner 
Real Estate Agents to 
facilitate sale or rental 
transaction 
Describe the Data (kWh, 
Therms, Participants, etc) 
Kwh; therms; cost Kwh; therms; cost Kwh; therms; cost 
Data Interval and Frequency 
(interval, monthly, annual, 
etc 
Average annual 
monthly data 
Average annual 
monthly data 
Monthly & average annual 
data each year 
Granularity (describe the 
categories/subtotals/data 
breakdowns) 
Individual building 
and/or meter 
Individual building 
and/or meter 
Individual building; may 
include multiple meters 
Purpose (Why is the Data 
Wanted/Needed?) 
By real estate 
agents/homebuyers to 
calculate annual 
energy budget 
Individual 
benchmarking- 
previous data may be 
needed to measure 
progress 
By real estate agents/buyers 
to calculate annual energy 
budget 
How will the Data Be Used? For potential owners 
to calculate annual 
budgets; to calculate 
cost-benefit analysis 
for energy 
improvements pre-sale 
To calculate cost-
benefit analysis for 
energy improvements; 
to measure energy 
efficiency 
improvements from 
previous owner 
For potential owners to 
calculate annual operations 
budgets; to calculate cost-
benefit analysis for energy 
improvements pre-sale; to 
measure energy efficiency 
improvements from previous 
owner 
Table 4. Use Cases relating to the rental and housing markets, as identified in the Minnesota Public 
Utilities Commission’s Customer Energy Usage Data Work Group Report. 
Source: CEUD Work Group Report, 2014, Appendix H. 
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In examining these use three cases, it is clear that Use Cases #1 and #2 are the most 
applicable to the current discussion. Use Case #1 identifies ways in which prospective 
homeowners may wish to assess operating costs and the costs of potential improvements; Use 
Case #2 identifies ways in which existing and prospective homeowners may wish to understand 
energy use and costs, and estimate the cost effectiveness of past improvements. However, Use 
Case #3 is inadequate at presenting the type of data that might be requested by a prospective 
renter because it inappropriately groups buyers of multi-family properties with renters of multi-
family properties. It then fails to provide information relevant to a prospective renter who might 
want the data. While buyers of multi-family properties are an important use case, this paper does 
not concern that group. However, Use Case #2 raises an important point relevant to prospective 
tenants of multi-family buildings with separate meters: “previous data may be needed.” 
Prospective tenants are often faced with this dilemma in separately metered buildings, as the 
landlord does not have access to the previous tenant’s account. Ultimately, however, while Use 
Cases #1 and #2 fairly represent how prospective homebuyers may want access to data, no 
meaningful information has been identified about disclosing information to prospective renters.48 
There is another important difference between Use Cases #1 and #2, as opposed to Use 
Case #3. While the first two only describe the release of “average annual monthly data,” Use Case 
#3 describes the release of both average annual data and “monthly” data. This distinction between 
“monthly” data and “average annual” data is an important one to differentiate, as time interval of 
data is a crucial component to understanding consumption data sensitivity. The following 
discussion will attempt to show how monthly and average annual data provide different amounts 
of information regarding resident behavior, but that both types provide significantly less 
information than minute-based data. 
IMT proposes a Utility Data Sensitivity Matrix,49 which can be helpful in visualizing the 
sensitivity of different types of data: 
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Figure 4. Institute for Market Transformation’s Data Sensitivity Matrix. 
Source: Burr, Keicher, and Majersik, “Utility Data Sensitivity Matrix.” 
 
As the number of aggregated meters decreases, data becomes more sensitive in terms of 
privacy. Thus, the most sensitive data is considered to be Residential, Real-Time data, as shown 
in the Wood and Newborough graph. The least sensitive data is considered to be Aggregated, 
Not-Residential data. 
If we consider the data interval proposed in Use Case #3, monthly data, this discussion 
focuses on the upper left-hand house in IMT’s Matrix, a single-metered Monthly Residential 
disclosure. In terms of the current discussion on data privacy, this data can be considered “semi-
sensitive.” On one hand, it is the most sensitive, least aggregated class of customer. On the other 
hand, it is the least sensitive type of data in terms of timeliness.  
To demonstrate what this data looks like, the following table shows an example of one 
year’s worth of monthly billing and usage data, along with read dates, billing days, average 
monthly temperature, and additional fees: 
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Last Read 
Date 
Billing 
Days 
Average 
Temp 
Electric 
Usage 
(kWh) 
Electric 
Charges 
Gas Usage 
(Therms) 
Gas 
Charges 
Total 
Fees 
Gas and 
Electric 
Total 
4/14/2015 29 42 ° F 252 $36.39  98 $79.46  $2.79  $118.64  
3/16/2015 32 22 ° F 279 $38.99  211 $172.89  $2.98  $214.86  
2/12/2015 29 25 ° F 274 $39.37  183 $149.89  $3.01  $192.27  
1/14/2015 34 19 ° F 395 $52.70  237 $202.52  $4.02  $259.24  
12/11/2014 31 21 ° F 302 $42.39  204 $176.78  $3.23  $222.40  
11/10/2014 29 48 ° F 233 $34.68  54 $50.20  $13.61  $98.49  
10/12/2014 31 57 ° F 338 $48.69  18 $22.15  $17.87  $88.71  
9/11/2014 30 71 ° F 382 $56.45  15 $19.90  $18.44  $94.79  
8/12/2014 29 74 ° F 382 $56.94  16 $20.10  $18.59  $95.63  
7/14/2014 32 72 ° F 425 $62.77  14 $19.06  $19.20  $101.03  
6/12/2014 30 65 ° F 192 $31.65  10 $16.26  $13.76  $61.67  
5/13/2014 29 49 ° F 163 $27.47  63 $54.72  $9.25  $91.44  
                  
Past Year 
Monthly 
Averages 30 47 ° F 301 $44.04 94 $81.99 $10.56 $136.60 
Past Year 
Monthly 
Totals 365 n/a 3617 $528.49 1123 $983.93 $126.75 $1,639.17 
Table 5. Example of monthly customer energy usage data, based on personal data generated from Xcel 
Energy’s website. 
Source: Personal data generated from Xcel website, “Xcel Energy: Home: My Account: My Usage: 
Download Energy Usage Report.” 
 
For purposes of comparison, we can graph this data and overlay Wood and Newborough’s 
strategy of identifying behavior patterns through energy use.50 
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Figures 5 and 6: Graphs generated from CEUD data, with Wood and Newborough behavior overlays. 
Source: Generated from personal data. 
 
 
The month-increment graph exposes different types of household activities from those 
exposed by the minute-increment graph. Someone analyzing this data would not be able to see 
when appliances have been operating throughout the course of the day. Rather, they would be 
able to infer heating and cooling versus baseload energy use, whether the property heats with 
electricity, and whether the property has gas appliances used during the summer. Additionally, 
although not shown in these graphs, monthly data could also be used to infer whether the property 
had been vacant for more than one month, used seasonally, or had some kind of appliance that 
had a very large electric draw throughout the year. Examples of appliances producing such draws 
are pools, hot tubs, medical equipment, and large amounts of lighting or electronics. However, 
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while the presence of a large electric draw could be detected, the source of the draw could not be 
definitively identified through monthly data alone.51 
If we instead consider the data proposed for release in Use Cases #1 and #2, average 
annual data, in IMT’s data sensitivity matrix, our discussion falls to the left of the upper left hand 
house, identified by the green circle. Simply, this data is even less sensitive than monthly data. 
 
Figure 7: IMT’s Utility Data Sensitivity Matrix with Green Circle identifying sensitivity placement of 
average annual data. 
Source: Burr, Keicher, and Majersik, “Utility Data Sensitivity Matrix,” altered. 
 
Using the same data as in the monthly example, this is an example of how average annual 
information might be presented: 
  
1 Meter: Gas Therms Cost Number of Days 
in Billing Period 
Heating 
High: 237 202.52 34 Yes 
Low: 10 16.26 30 
Monthly 
Average: 
94 81.99 30 
1 Meter: Electric Kilowatt Hours Cost Number of Days 
in Billing Period 
Heating 
High: 425 62.77 32 No 
Low: 163 27.47 29 
Monthly 
Average 
301 44.04 30 
Table 6. Example of average annual customer energy use data, based on personal data generated from Xcel 
Energy’s website. 
Source: Generated from personal data from Xcel Energy’s website, modeled after lookup tool through 
Madison Gas and Electric, “Madison Gas and Electric: Average Energy Use and Cost for Residential 
Addresses.” 
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When average annual data is graphed and behavioral patterns are overlayed, we can come up with 
the following graphs: 
 
 
 
Figures 8 and 9: Graphed average annual CEUD with Wood and Newborough behavior overlay. 
Source: Generated from personal CEUD data from Xcel Energy Website. 
 
With average annual data, along with high month and low months, it is possible to see 
overall home energy use and cost throughout the year, and to guess which months may be higher- 
or lower-use based on residential gas and electricity use patterns.52  
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With this in mind, the previously identified privacy concerns are no longer as relevant: 
 
Privacy Concern Discussion in regards to disclosure in housing/rental markets 
1. Identity Theft Seller/landlord has already released their name to buyer/tenant, although 
previous tenant may be unknown by name; generally, not relevant 
2. Determine Personal Behavior 
Patterns 
 
Possible to see that property had been used seasonally in past and infer that 
seller or previous tenant may occupy their next property seasonally 
3. Determine Specific Appliances 
Used 
Possible to infer that property was heated with electric heat or had some 
energy-intensive appliance, such as a pool or hot tub; the existence of these 
types of appliances, with the exception of space heaters, would be disclosed 
to buyer/renter anyway 
4. Perform Real-Time Surveillance Not relevant 
5. Reveal Activities Through 
Residual Data 
Not relevant 
6. Targeted Home Invasions (latch 
key children, elderly, etc.) 
Not relevant; data would be from previous account holder, and so would 
not apply to future account holder 
7. Provide Accidental Invasions 
 
Not relevant 
8. Activity Censorship 
 
Not relevant 
9. Decisions and Actions Based Upon 
Inaccurate Data 
 
Not relevant 
10. Profiling Possible to profile a seller as a seasonal home user. Also, if person using 
data had access to meaningful comparable data, seller could be identified as 
a higher or lower than average energy user. 
 
11. Unwanted Publicity and 
Embarrassment 
 
Possible to profile a seller as a seasonal home user. Also, if person using 
data had access to meaningful comparable data, seller could be identified as 
a higher or lower than average energy user. 
12. Tracking Behavior Of 
Renters/Leasers 
 
Landlords may be able to see if property was used seasonally or had higher 
or lower than average bills 
13. Behavior Tracking (possible 
combination with Personal Behavior 
Patterns) 
Not relevant 
14. Public Aggregated Searches 
Revealing Individual Behavior 
 
Not relevant 
Table 7: Potential Privacy Impacts cited by Anti-Smart Meter Advocates, as applied to either monthly or 
average annual consumption data. 
Source: Altered table from Herold, “Potential Privacy Impacts for Smart Grid Information Disclosure and 
Misuse.” Electronic Privacy Information Center, “The Smart Grid and Privacy.” 
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These demonstrations show that the longer the data interval, the less information about 
behavior patterns can be determined. While it can be useful to demonstrate how different time 
intervals of data reveal different types of usage patterns, at the end of the day, this data comes 
from households that will no longer reside at the property producing the data. Even if someone 
were planning on using CEUD to assess resident behavior patterns, information obtained would 
cease to be relevant as a new household moves into the property.  
However, the more important point of this discussion is that while the release of this 
information does not pose a significant privacy threat to existing (soon-to-be-previous) account 
holders, it does provide prospective account holders with a significant benefit in being able to 
plan for their operating and investment costs. Local governments around the country have 
recognized this benefit, as various cities have enacted ordinances that require data or rating 
disclosure in the housing and rental markets.  
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Case Study: Existing Disclosure Options in Saint Paul, MN 
In order to survey the existing types of disclosure options within a local area, this paper 
uses Saint Paul, Minnesota as a case study. Saint Paul is provided with both natural gas and 
electricity by Xcel Energy. 
I propose a modified alternative to ACEEE’s previously identified disclosure types of 
Asset Ratings, Utility Bills, Energy Efficiency Features, and Benchmarking. Instead, I suggest Data, 
Rating, Structure, and Combination Disclosures. These new categories are more applicable to 
disclosure in the housing and rental markets: Data Disclosure is more comprehensive than Utility 
Bills, as it specifies both energy use and costs, whereas Utility Bills can be interpreted to mean 
just costs; Rating corresponds well to Asset Rating; Structure can include Energy Efficiency 
Features, but involves a more comprehensive disclosure about the physical structure of the 
property; Combination, such as an Energy Audit, involves a combination of Data, Rating, and/or 
Structure Disclosure. To demonstrate how this model can be used to assess effectiveness at 
reducing energy information asymmetry in the housing and rental markets, these disclosure types 
will be applied in the following case study of existing disclosure options in Saint Paul, Minnesota. 
Table 8 lists existing options by Type of Disclosure (Data, Rating, Structure, 
Combination), Disclosure Option, and Administering Body. Each option will then be described 
and evaluated based on its effectiveness at reducing information asymmetry in the housing and 
rental markets. 
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Type of Disclosure Disclosure Option Administering Body 
Data Consent Forms Xcel Energy 
Renter’s Single-Meter Disclosure Landlord 
Rating Green Building NorthStar MLS 
HERS Index NorthStar MLS 
Structure 
 
Truth-in-Sale-of-Housing (“TISH”) City of Saint Paul 
Seller’s Disclosure Seller 
Appraisal Appraiser 
Home Inspection Home Inspector 
Rental Inspection City of Saint Paul 
Combination Direct Request Buyer 
Energy Audit Neighborhood Energy Connection 
(Xcel Energy), Independent 
Contractors 
 Table 8: Existing Disclosure Options in the Saint Paul Housing and Rental Market 
Source: Generated from survey of Saint Paul disclosure landscape. 
  
 
Data Disclosure 
 
Consent Forms 
Xcel will release consumption data to a third party if the existing account holder agrees 
through a written consent form. Requestors must provide their name and contact information, 
along with their reason for requesting the data. Requestors have the option to see data for the past 
month, most recent 12 months, most recent 24 months, or most recent 36 months.53 
A landlord who actually wants to provide information to a prospective tenant will often 
encounter difficulties releasing data because the previous tenant’s information is not the 
landlord’s to give. In such cases landlords do not have information about their own property, 
which is a problem in itself. To mitigate this, it is possible for a landlord to request that a new 
tenant sign a consent form when signing the lease. Doing so ensures that the landlord will have 
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future access to account information, and also means that the landlord can release this data to 
future tenants if they choose to do so. 
  
Renter’s Single-Meter Disclosure 
According to Section 504B.215 of the Minnesota Statutes, landlords who rent a “single-
metered residential building” must disclose energy information costs to prospective tenants.54 A 
“single metered residential building” is described as “a multiunit rental building with one or more 
separate residential living units where the utility service measured through a single meter provides 
service to an individual unit and to all or parts of common areas or other units.” With limited 
exceptions, the landlord of a single-metered residential building must be the account holder for 
that meter, and must provide prospective tenants with monthly billing information for the past 
year. The following statutory excerpt shows the disclosure provisions: 
504B.215 BILLING; LOSS OF SERVICES. 
Subd. 2a. Conditions of separate utility billing to tenant in single-meter 
buildings. 
  
(a) A landlord of a single-metered residential building who bills for 
utility charges separate from the rent: 
(1) must provide prospective tenants notice of the total utility cost for 
the building for each month of the most recent calendar year; 
(2) must predetermine and put in writing for all leases an equitable 
method of apportionment and the frequency of billing by the landlord; 
(3) must include in the lease a provision that, upon a tenant's request, 
the landlord must provide a copy of the actual utility bill for the building 
along with each apportioned utility bill. Upon a tenant's request, a landlord 
must also provide past copies of actual utility bills for any period of the 
tenancy for which the tenant received an apportioned utility bill. Past 
copies of utility bills must be provided for the preceding two years or from 
the time the current landlord acquired the building, whichever is most 
recent; and 
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(4) may, if the landlord and tenant agree, provide tenants with a lease 
term of one year or more the option to pay those bills under an annualized 
budget plan providing for level monthly payments based on a good faith 
estimate of the annual bill. 
 
 
Rating Disclosure 
  
Rating Filters on NorthStar MLS55 
The only rating disclosure mechanism currently available to prospective homebuyers is 
through the NorthStar Multiple Listing Service (“MLS”). The NorthStar MLS is the largest MLS 
in the state of Minnesota, as four of its members are REALTOR Associations that comprise 80% 
of the REALTORS in the state.56  
One year ago, the NorthStar MLS added two rating search filters into their home search 
options: a checkbox for “Green Certification” and an option for reporting Home Energy Rating 
System (“HERS”) Index. The Green Certification checkbox indicates that a home has received 
any type of third-party green building certification.57 Of the estimated 20,000 properties currently 
listed on the NorthStar MLS, about 70 of these have a HERS rating. It is unknown how many are 
labeled as having a Green Certification. 
A seller who receives a Green Certification or a HERS rating and wants to report it can 
ask their real estate agent to list it on the NorthStar MLS. However, this disclosure is not 
mandatory, and if a seller receives an inefficient HERS score, they are not required to disclose it. 
Only members may use the NorthStar MLS database, however, so individual homebuyers mostly 
cannot search the database. Still, individual homebuyers can search real estate listings through 
brokerage websites, which draw upon the MLS. When a new search filter is added, it generally 
does not get passed along to brokerage websites until it has been around at least a year. This is 
done to make sure there aren’t any unforeseen consequences from the new information’s 
introduction into the market. 
The Green Certification button and the HERS rating disclosures have not yet been 
approved for disclosure beyond the MLS, and so do not appear on brokerage websites and cannot 
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be searched by individuals. They are likely to become available on brokerage websites in the 
summer of 2015. 
 
Structure Disclosure 
 
Truth in Sale of Housing58 
The basic purpose of most Truth in Sale of Housing (“TISH”) laws is to provide a 
homebuyer with an unbiased visual inspection that shows a “snapshot” of a house at a particular 
time. In Saint Paul, TISH reports are required with each property sale,59 and so are available to 
the general public through the City’s website.60 The Saint Paul TISH report also provides a 
supplemental section for home insulation assessment. TISH inspectors may report the presence, 
type, and depth of insulation found in the attic, foundation, knee walls, and rim joists of the home. 
Homebuyers looking for energy information about the property may look to this supplemental 
section of the TISH report to understand insulation levels. 
  
Seller’s Disclosure 
The seller’s disclosure law of Minnesota operates on a statewide level and is a form of 
guaranteed disclosure to consumers in the housing market. Seller’s Disclosures are required at 
every point of sale. The Disclosure is a form, filled out by the Seller, which tries to capture both 
the historical and existing conditions of the property; it does not require energy information to be 
listed on the form. The statute states: 
513.55 GENERAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.61 
Subdivision 1.Contents. 
(a) Before signing an agreement to sell or transfer residential real property, 
the seller shall make a written disclosure to the prospective buyer. The 
disclosure must include all material facts of which the seller is aware that 
could adversely and significantly affect: 
(1) an ordinary buyer's use and enjoyment of the property; or 
(2) any intended use of the property of which the seller is aware. 
(b) The disclosure must be made in good faith and based upon the best of 
the seller's knowledge at the time of the disclosure. 
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Subd. 2.Disclosure to licensee. 
A seller may provide the written disclosure required under sections 513.52 
to 513.60 to a real estate licensee representing or assisting the prospective 
buyer. The written disclosure provided to the real estate licensee 
representing or assisting the prospective buyer is considered to have been 
provided to the prospective buyer. If the written disclosure is provided to the 
real estate licensee representing or assisting the prospective buyer, the real 
estate licensee shall provide a copy to the prospective buyer. 
 
Appraisals 
Appraisals are a form of structure disclosure that are available to homebuyers in 
Minnesota, but are intended to inform the lender about the property’s value, rather than educate 
the homebuyer about the structure. While appraisals are not a required by law to purchase a 
house, they are typically required by lender to obtain a mortgage loan. Minnesota appraisers are 
required to adhere to certain standards of practice and conduct,62 although there is no standard 
stating that they must include energy-related information in their evaluation.  
However, it is common for lenders to require appraisers to use standard documents such as 
the Uniform Residential Appraisal Report (“URAR,” Form 1004) or the Individual Condominium 
Unit Appraisal Report (Form 1073), both of which are distributed by the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (“FNMA” or “Fannie Mae”).63 The URAR contains many checkboxes that 
could be used to infer information about the property’s energy use—such as heating fuel type, age 
of property, presence of a pool, etc.—as well as a specific line item for valuing “energy efficient 
items.”64 
 
Home Inspections 
Prospective Saint Paul homebuyers have the option to request a home inspection prior to 
sale. Home inspectors in Minnesota are not required to be certified and there is no uniform home 
inspection process; as such, a home inspection may or may not provide a prospective buyer with 
energy-related information.  
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Rental Inspections 
         Prospective Saint Paul renters can find property-specific structural information related to 
health and safety through City Rental Inspection results. Owners of Saint Paul rental properties 
are required to register their properties with the City and have periodic Fire Inspections through 
the Department of Safety and Inspections. Inspection results are available in-person or through 
the City’s online property lookup tool. Information about energy costs is limited to minimal shell-
related structural considerations, such the presence of doors and windows. 
 
Combination Disclosure 
 
Direct Disclosure 
Direct disclosure entails the buyer or renter asking the seller or landlord directly about 
utility bills, rating, or structural information. The successful transfer of information relies upon 
the information existing in a useful format; the owner being willing to disclosure the information; 
the owner having access to the information, and; the owner being able to effectively transmit the 
information to the buyer or renter. 
 
Energy Audits 
A prospective buyer in Saint Paul may request an energy audit from a seller. In Saint Paul, 
audits requested by prospective homebuyers will usually be provided through Xcel Energy and 
administered by a local nonprofit, The Neighborhood Energy Connection (“NEC”).65 If the seller 
consents to an energy audit, the auditor will provide the buyer with consumption data, an Energy 
Fit Homes rating score,66 and energy-related structural information about the property. 
 
Discussion of Existing Options 
 
To evaluate each option’s effectiveness at reducing energy information asymmetry in the 
housing and rental markets, this paper first identified elements that would make up a strong 
energy disclosure policy. The policy that will be the most effective at reducing energy 
information asymmetry in the rental and housing markets will: 
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1. Provide consumers with adequate information about energy cost and use; 
2. Provide consumers with access to the same types of information for comparable 
properties; 
3. Be mandatory, and; 
4. Be available for both prospective homebuyers and renters. 
 
Therefore, to evaluate the effectiveness of existing disclosure policies at reducing energy 
information asymmetry, the paper asks the following of each option: 
 
1. To what degree does the existing disclosure option provide prospective buyers and 
renters with information about energy cost and use at the property? (3=high, 2=med, 
1=low, 0=none)?  
2. To what degree does the existing disclosure option allow prospective buyers and 
renters to compare the disclosed information with other similar properties? 
3. To what degree is the disclosure option mandatory? 
4. To what degree does the disclosure option exist in both the housing and rental 
markets? 
 
A perfectly effective disclosure option, therefore, will receive a score of 12, while a completely 
ineffective option will receive a score of zero. 
 
Type of 
Disclosure 
Disclosure Option Disclosure 
Provides 
Consumer 
with Energy 
Cost and Use 
Information 
Disclosure 
Allows 
Consumer to 
Easily 
Compare 
Information 
with other 
properties 
Mandatory Exists in 
Housing and 
Rental 
Markets  
Effectiveness 
Scores 
Data Utility Disclosure 
(consent form 
required) 
3 1 0 2 6 
Renter’s Single- 3 2  3 0 8 
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Meter Disclosure 
Rating Green Building 2 2 0 0 4 
HERS Index 2 2 0 0 4 
Structure 
 
Truth-in-Sale-of-
Housing (TISH) 
1 3 3 0 7 
Seller’s Disclosure 1 1 3 0 5 
Appraisal 1 1 3 0 5 
Home Inspection 1 0 0 0 1 
Rental Inspection 0 2 3 0 5 
Combinatio
n 
Direct Request 3 1 0 2 6 
Energy Audit 3 0  0 0 4 
Table 9: Effectiveness Assessment of Existing Disclosure Options in the Saint Paul Housing and Rental 
Market 
Source: Generated from survey of Saint Paul disclosure landscape.  
 
Based on the selected criteria for reducing information asymmetry, the Renter’s Single-
Meter Disclosure ranks the highest, while Home Inspections ranks the lowest. Interestingly, the 
group that the Renter’s Statute is intended to serve—renters who pay energy costs that are 
“rolled-in” to their rent—is less likely to have an incentive to conserve energy because they aren’t 
the ones paying the bills. While this disclosure option does provide a high degree of consumer 
protection for a group that might otherwise be completely unprotected from price gauging by 
landlords, there is little information about whether it actually has helped prospective renters exert 
market pressure on landlords to invest in efficiency measures.  
One notable trend is that while data and combination disclosures options provide high 
levels of information on energy cost and use to the consumer, rating disclosure provides medium 
levels, and structure disclosure provides low levels. Rating disclosure, while a good measurement 
of building efficiency, does not provide a customer with a picture of energy cost and use; just 
because a home uses energy efficiently does not mean that it has low energy bills and use relative 
to other properties on the market.67 While certain structure disclosures do consider factors such as 
level of attic insulation, the relationship between the physical attributes and energy use is difficult 
to assess without data and other forms of testing; for example, a home may be well-insulated, but 
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improperly air sealed, which would reveal itself during a blower door test but not a naked eye 
inspection. 
 Ultimately, no single existing policy in Saint Paul is completely effective at reducing 
information asymmetry in the housing and rental markets; in fact, most existing disclosure 
options are less than fifty percent effective based on the above criteria. 
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Policy Alternatives 
 
To address this market deficiency, this paper proposes the following alternatives for 
evaluation: 
 
1. The City of Saint Paul should adopt an Audit Disclosure Ordinance; 
2. The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission should make a rule on Docket 12-1344, or a 
separate docket if needed, that directs regulated utilities to make available average annual 
building energy use and cost information to the public, and; 
3. The Minnesota Legislature should amend the Seller’s Disclosure statute to specify that 
energy use and information is required at point of sale. 
 
To evaluate these proposed alternatives, this section will examine each of these 
alternatives based on the following criteria:  cost effectiveness, potential impact, political 
feasibility, and administrative feasibility. In determining cost-effectiveness, the same 
effectiveness criteria will be used as presented in the Saint Paul case study. Assessments are 
discussed in the sections below, with summary tables listed after the proposed alternatives. 
 
 
Policy Alternative 1: Audit Disclosure Ordinance 
 
The City of Saint Paul should adopt an Audit Disclosure Ordinance, similar to Austin 
Energy’s Energy Conservation Audit and Disclosure (“ECAD”) Ordinance.  The ECAD 
Ordinance was enacted in 2008, implemented in 2009, and amended in 2011. It requires that all 
sellers of residential properties served by Austin Energy, a municipal electric utility, within the 
Austin city limits, receive an energy audit before sale of the home. In addition, all multi-family 
properties must receive an energy audit every ten years and provide existing and prospective 
tenants with audit results. Energy audits in Austin release data, rating, and structure information. 
Based on these established effectiveness criteria, an audit disclosure ordinance in Saint 
Paul modeled after Austin’s ECAD Ordinance would be very effective at disclosing energy cost 
and use information to prospective participants, particularly if audits continued to provide 
 
43 
information about data, rating, and structure. Likewise, it would be effective at allowing 
prospective homebuyers and renters to compare energy cost and use information across their 
respective markets. While this type of policy would reach both prospective buyers and 
prospective renters of multi-family units, it does not reach one group that may be a substantial one 
in Saint Paul: renters of non-multi-family units. 
This type of program is likely to be very expensive; Xcel currently provides audits at a 
cost of $100.00 for a single-family home, a rate much lower than the real market value of an 
audit, which ranges from $250.00 to $375.00.68 The costs are just for the audits themselves, and 
do not account for the administrative costs that would be incurred at the city, MLS, and NEC 
levels.  
To assess potential impact, some very rough estimates can be made by looking to the 
energy, cost, and emissions savings experienced by Austin in their first year of the ordinance. 
 
 Austin (first year of program)69 Saint Paul (predicted)70 
Population (2010) 810,759 285,068 
Energy Savings (kwh/year)71 7,788,000 2,738,310 
Cost Savings ($/year) 723,650 254,440 
Emissions Savings 
(tons CO2/year) 
4897 1722 
Table 10: First Year Austin Energy ECAD Ordinance Impacts and predicted Impacts of Audit Disclosure 
Ordinance in Saint Paul 
Source: Austin information from Austin Energy, Saint Paul population from ACS, Saint Paul Savings 
information generated. 
 
These calculations are too simplistic to be a meaningful estimation of actual savings 
potential in Saint Paul. The chart nevertheless demonstrates an important point about the potential 
impact of an Audit Disclosure Ordinance: potential savings would be very easy to measure. This 
means that audit disclosures, in addition to being beneficial for consumer protection and placing 
market value on efficiency, could potentially enable the City to more effectively benchmark its 
own progress toward meeting energy goals. 
The political feasibility of the Audit Disclosure Ordinance alternative is low. First, the 
City already requires TISH reports; some might think that an additional disclosure requirement 
would be redundant or wasteful. Second, Saint Paul has a precedent of being less strict with 
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disclosures: the Saint Paul TISH, as opposed to many other TISH ordinances around the state, is 
“disclosure-only,” meaning that neither the seller nor the buyer must fix found deficiencies before 
the sale closes. The disclosure requirement is much more lax than TISH requirements in other 
cities. For example, Saint Louis Park’s TISH requires that all deficiencies be addressed and the 
property be brought up to code.72 Finally, low-income communities or their advocates would 
likely not favor this type of policy, as it would burden sellers with additional costs. 
Administrative feasibility is also low. Part of what makes Austin’s program easier to 
administrate is the fact that Austin Energy is a municipal utility, so the city and the utility can 
more directly work together to make sure audits get done. Saint Paul, on the other hand, might not 
legally be able to assign the task to the utility. Instead, it might need to bid out the program 
through a request for proposals, or even open up to any number of qualifying individuals. It is 
additionally unclear whether information would be made available through the city, through an 
MLS or other housing market mechanism, or through the administering agency. 
 
Policy Alternative 2: MPUC Rule 
 
The MPUC should make a rule on Docket 12-1344 that directs regulated utilities to 
release average annual building energy use and cost information, along with high/low figures. 
This policy alternative essentially allows Xcel to return to their previously established practice 
with official MPUC sanctioning. 
 In evaluating the effectiveness of this proposed alternative at reducing information 
asymmetry, this alternative ranks highly in terms of disclosing energy cost and use information to 
consumers. It is less effective in allowing consumers to easily compare information between 
properties, as consumers would need to call Xcel each time they wanted to find out a property’s 
information. While this alternative would be “mandatory” in the sense that it would require Xcel 
to release this information upon request, there would be nothing mandatory in place to ensure that 
buyers and renters will end up with the information. In other words, it still places the onus on the 
renter or buyer to find the information, making the policy less effective. It would be available to 
customers in both the rental and housing markets, although not applicable to those in the rental 
market who are interested in renting from a Single-Metered property. Of course, the Renter’s 
Single-Meter Statute protects the latter class of renters. 
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 An MPUC ruling would be a very low cost alternative for utilities since such disclosures 
were common practice until recently. In fact, this alternative may even save money, in the form of 
administrative costs, for utilities like Xcel and CenterPoint since fewer people would need to 
submit a Consent Form, and could instead simply call the utility’s customer service line. 
 The potential impact of returning to prior policy is unknown at this point. An MPUC 
ruling would certainly increase consumer protection for those who need to calculate operating 
costs. It is unlikely, however, to generate market value for efficiency. That said, this alternative 
might open the door to future advances in reducing information asymmetry. If Xcel is directed to 
release this information upon request, it may allow the company to later implement a web-based 
property lookup tool, similar to those employed by Gainesville Green or Madison Gas and 
Electric.73 A property lookup tool would allow consumers to more effectively compare market 
information, which would likely have the intended effect of placing market value on low bills and 
de-valuing high bills. 
 The political feasibility of an MPUC ruling is moderate. Given that all utilities reporting in 
the CEUD Work Group reported having participated in this disclosure practice until recently, it 
may be that the MPUC would decide this is not a use case that warrants Consent Forms. 
Additionally, if the type of data to be released was average annual data, rather than monthly data, 
it would likely to assuage existing privacy concerns. The utilities will not likely argue against 
such a policy; their interest lies in providing good customer service while protecting themselves 
from liability.  
 The administrative feasibility of this alternative is high, as all utilities either recently 
practiced or continue to practice this form of data release. 
 
Policy Alternative 3: Seller’s Disclosure Amendment 
 
The Minnesota Legislature should amend the Seller’s Disclosure Statute to specify that 
energy use and cost information is required at point of sale. 
The Seller’s Disclosure Statute appears to support the statement that if a buyer wanted 
access to consumption data, they should be able to obtain it by arguing that their energy bills will 
affect their “use or enjoyment of the property.” This implies that by listing a house on the market, 
a seller has essentially said that they will disclose any information about the property that the 
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buyer may want, which may include energy cost and use information. This has interesting 
implications for Xcel’s policy to only disclose data when the account holder consents; if the seller 
has given implied consent to “use or enjoyment” disclosure, it is possible that Xcel could disclose 
data for houses on the market, without creating liability for themselves. 
However, assuming that Xcel does not want to take that liability risk, and so will not be 
interested in reverting back to its old disclosure policies, the policy alternative is to amend the 
Seller’s Disclosure itself. This would need to be done by the Minnesota Legislature. 
Subjecting this policy to the “effectiveness” test yields mixed results. A statutory 
amendment would rank highly in terms of providing energy cost and use information to 
prospective buyers. If the seller’s disclosure were available to homebuyers early in the home-
buying process, it would be effective at allowing prospective buyers to compare information 
across the market. If it were not released until later, it would be less effective. While the policy 
would require mandatory disclosure to prospective buyers, it would only exist in the housing 
market and would not apply to the rental market. 
The cost of implementing such a policy would likely be low. There could be some 
administrative costs in updating and distributing Seller’s Disclosure forms throughout the state, 
but these are updated periodically, anyway. 
The potential impact of the policy is moderate. While the policy would serve to increase 
the amount of consumer protection in the rental and housing markets, it is not clear whether it 
would increase market pressure on seller’s to upgrade their property with energy efficient 
measures.  
Political feasibility is low in the current legislative environment. A bill amending the 
seller’s disclosure statute to release energy data might be approved in the DFL-controlled 
Minnesota Senate, but would likely not be approved in the GOP-controlled Minnesota House. 
Specifically, policies regarding data release must make it through the Civil Law and Data 
Practices Committee, which has demonstrated an interest in more restrictive data privacy 
practices. For example, earlier this legislative session, a bill to amend the Renter’s Single-Meter 
Statute to increase disclosure to prospective tenants did not receive a hearing in the Committee.74 
However, an amendment to the statute would likely be very feasible from an 
administrative perspective. Xcel’s recent efforts to make it easier for customers to obtain their 
own energy data – such as adopting the Green Button program and revamping their website – 
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would make it very easy for sellers to access their data and provide a copy in the Seller’s 
Disclosure.75 
 
Policy Alternatives Summary Tables 
 
The above information can be summarized in two tables: an Effectiveness Assessment 
table that evaluates the policy alternatives on the same Saint Paul disclosure options scale, and a 
Policy Alternatives Evaluation, which looks at the proposed alternatives based upon the criteria 
described above. 
 
Type of 
Disclosure 
Disclosure 
Option 
Disclosure 
Provides 
Consumer 
with Energy 
Cost and Use 
Information 
Disclosure 
Allows 
Consumer to 
easily 
compare 
property 
information 
with other 
properties  
Mandatory  Exists in 
Housing 
and Rental 
Markets  
Effectiveness 
Score  
Combination Audit 
Disclosure 
Ordinance 
3 2 3 2 10 
Data Utilities 
release 
average 
annual 
information  
3 2 1 3 9 
Data Amend 
Seller’s 
Disclosure 
3 2 3 0 8 
Table 11. Effectiveness Assessments of Proposed Policy Alternatives 
Source: Survey of existing options in Saint Paul.  
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Policy Alternative Cost-Effectiveness Potential Impact Political 
Feasibility 
Administrative 
Feasibility 
Audit Disclosure 
Ordinance 
Med High Low Low 
Release of Annual 
Average Data 
upon request 
Med Low/High Med High 
Amend Seller’s 
Disclosure 
Med Med Low High 
Table 12: Policy Alternatives evaluation based on selected criteria.  
Source: Survey of existing options in Saint Paul.  
 
Policy Recommendation 
Based on evaluations of the proposed alternatives, the recommendation of this paper is 
that the MPUC should make a rule directing utilities to disclose average annual data along with 
high and low month figures. This alternative has no monetary cost to the utilities, but provides 
prospective homebuyers and tenants with a planning tool they had until recently. While it is only 
moderately effective at reducing information asymmetry in the rental and housing markets, it has 
the potential to have a large impact on creating market value around efficiency, if paired with a 
website lookup tool.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Discussions surrounding data privacy tend to assume that a greater amount of privacy is 
always better for consumers. Yet in the case of customer energy use disclosure in the housing and 
rental markets, we can see that this is not always the case.    
One major contributor to this discourse is an assumed a level of home surveillance that is 
not relevant to the type of data being disclosed in this use case. Instead, the type of data proposed 
for disclosing information in the housing and rental markets is beneficial to consumers because it 
not only helps them understand how the structure of the property performs in terms of energy use, 
but it also helps them prepare for operating costs. Recent practices have interfered with both 
consumer protection practices and efforts to advance building efficiency through market 
mechanisms. 
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Energy data practices in the residential market will only continue to become more 
important as distributed generation, such as rooftop solar, becomes more widespread. In order for 
meaningful impacts to be made at both the household and societal level, it is critical that our data 
practices appropriately balance concerns of privacy and access in different circumstances. 
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